Este trabajo consiste en una reconstrucción de los motivos de reflexión en ese ámbito privilegiado de la experiencia filosófica al que de la mano de Habermas, vamos a denominar pensamiento postmetafísico, como superación mediadora de la eterna disputa entre el pensar metafísico y el pensar antimetafísico. En él desarrollaremos aquellas categorías empírico-trascendentales que van a constituir las condiciones de posibilidad de esta nueva experiencia filosófica, a saber, racionalidad procedimental, razón sin trascendencia, razón comunicativa, giro lingüístico y deflación de lo extracotidiano.

The thesis that I wish to discuss in this paper is the next: Human Sciences (Cultural Sciences according to Dilthey, Historic-Hermeneutic sciences according to Habermas) are possible as far as the method that should make all of them possible can be epistemologically justified, this method is the hermeneutic understanding of meaning, whose central point is, in fact, the hermeneutic circle. The matter is to try to justify epistemologically the hermeneutic as understanding the meaning of the own and the other ones (...) life experiences within reflexivity and reciprocity that impregnates the structure of ordinary language. In the dialogue Habermas to Dilthey, in Knowledge and Human Interests appear many arguments to this foundation. Our text will make special emphasis in the next items: distinction between natural sciences and cultural sciences, hermeneutic understanding of meaning, ordinary language and reflexivity, specificity of the hermeneutic circle, science an vital context, and, finally, we are going to make an account of the Habermas interpretation of the Dilthey start point in bases to the relationships between Historic-hermeneutic sciences and the practice interest of the knowledge. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objeto poner de manifiesto las claves suarecianas de la teoría de la libertad, de acuerdo con las cuales la libertad es una potencia activa de la voluntad que, si bien se muestra indiferente en el acto de elección, sin embargo, se trata de una indiferencia activa, en la medida en que el ser humano ejerce una específica causalidad por libertad que tiene su fundamento metafísico en la teoría del acto virtual. El hombre es libre porque el (...) concurso divino no determina el acto de la voluntad libre, sino que deja al libre arbitrio humano la decisión de actuar o no actuar, de hacer una cosa o su opuesta. (shrink)

Knowledge and true relations represent the principal task of Theory of Knowledge. This paper argues about various solutions to the justification of knowledge, given by William James, Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas. For classic Pragmatism Knowledge and Truth converge with the idea of a guideline, direction and orientation with an effective value for men. The Newpragmatism represented by Rorty tries out the way of the widest possible widening of justification contexts, taking as last referent the features of a western liberal (...) culture. Habermas pleads for a strong idealization in his discussion with Rorty up to the ideal speech situation. (shrink)

La tesis que deseo discutir en este trabajo es la siguiente: las ciencias humanas (ciencias del espíritu según Dilthey, ciencias histórico-hermenéuticas según Habermas) son posibles en la medida en que pueda ser epistemológicamente justificado el método que las hace posibles, a saber, la comprensión hermenéutica del sentido cuyo núcleo central lo constituye el círculo hermenéutico. Se trata, pues, de justificar epistemológicamente la hermenéutica como comprensión del sentido de las vivencias propias y ajenas, para lo cual es preciso analizar la reflexividad (...) y reciprocidad que impregna la estructura del lenguaje ordinario. En el diálogo que Habermas establece con Dilthey en Conocimiento e interés aparecen los suficientes argumentos para dicha fundamentación. Nuestro texto hará especial hincapié en los siguientes tópicos: distinción entre ciencias de la naturaleza y ciencias del espíritu, comprensión hermenéutica del sentido, lenguaje ordinario y reflexividad, especificidad del círculo hermenéutico, ciencia y contexto vital, y, finalmente, haremos un balance de la interpretación habermasiana de Dilthey a partir de las relaciones entre ciencias histórico-hermenéuticas e interés práctico del conocimiento. (shrink)

I propose in this paper a reflection, a self-analysis, about my extensive teaching experience, not from a formal point of view of the specificity of the program and the subjects of my courses, but about the singularity of the teaching activities. The commitment with the students, with the topic taught and with the Institution in which I have the honor to work, constitute the fundamental motive that leads and conducts my profession as teacher. My explanation displays ten items. Each of (...) them presents a speculation about one of the ideal elements of the good teacher all of us aim to be. For that reason this essay is not a positivist description of the teaching reality, but it expects to reconstruct the critical demarcation between the ideality which all of us try to achieve and the empirical reality that constantly pull us in the opposite direction. The coercion without coercions of the exemplariness pushes us to maintain alive the faith in the appropriation of the nature and soul of the ideal teacher. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore the concept of Philosophy within the works written by Wittgenstein if we take into account the ambivalent sense of the term phármakon. Thus, it will be outlined a contest of paradoxes between, on the one hand, healthiness, sanity, and the adaptable confidence produced by western rationality materialized into objective science, and, on the other hand, sickness, insanity, the world of perplexities, and the realm of desire and death, essential to philosophical thought. Bearing (...) in mind last Wittgenstein’s approaches, we will understand the Tractatus both critical to the deficiencies of western Reason and imprisoned within them. But the “enchanting” power of western Reason, conducting to identify rationality and scientificity in that work, will be conjured in the last Wittgenstein through the opening of plural realms of rationality and of discourses. In this way, philosophical questions will be rescued from silence and absurdity. (shrink)